Industry at sea may be considered either as resource extraction and exploitation-oil, gas, and fishing-or as commercial transport including passenger carrying operations. The scale and distribution of the associated hazards are immense.
In the oil and gas industry fatal and non-fatal accident experience from 1974 to 1978 was reviewed by the Burgoyne Committee set up to assess the Department of Energy's safety regulations. " The incidence of all accidents affecting offshore workers was half the rate for coal miners but twice that for manufacturing industry. Fatalities from falls overboard alone decreased from 0-57 to 0-27 per 1000 at risk (1979-83) (A Gillam, 4th Annual Offshore Search and Rescue Communications Conference, Leith, 1985) . Between 1985 there were 112 fatal accidents, corresponding with a mean mortality rate of 1-0 per 1000.20 Fifty per cent of total accident mortality in the industry had less to do with direct physical environmental influences on boats (the "Act of God" mentality) but rather more to do with traumatic amputation of limbs owing to inadequate or absent machinery guards; skull and spinal injuries rendered by falls from ill designed ladders or into unprotected hatchways; and drowning from falls overboard made more likely by inadequate or missing guard rails. Once overboard, survival is hampered by the absence of lifejackets, thermal protection, and personal locator beacons. Fishing boats are still not required to carry immersion suits for emergency use and, although survival training is now more widespread,24 it is below the standards of the oil industry and it is still not compulsory. These avoidable shortcomings ignore the effects of hypothermia,25-29 particularly in the North Sea,30 31 and the value of survival training.32 Furthermore, within the apparent safety of ports, accidents and drownings still occur-possibly because of inadequate ship to shore access and poor artificial lighting.3334 The Health and Safety Commission has.proposed regulations governing the loading and unloading of fishing boats at the quayside but not for fishing operations at sea.35 At sea, where the accident risks are greater, the Factory Inspectorate does not have the authority or, apparently, the intention to be concerned. This anomaly is compounded by the lack of any effort at sea by the DTp to detect and prosecute boats infringing minimal health and safety standards. And yet the ability to police legislation at sea is proved: officers of the Fishery Protection Squadron regularly board fishing boats to monitor compliance with far more intricate laws governing mesh size of nets and EEC fish quota restrictions.
The title of the recent well intentioned but very restricted statute-the Safety at Sea Act 198636 conveys an erroneous impression of all embracing legislation. This Act will require the fitting of automatically releasing liferafts and emergency position indicating radio beacons on fishing boats but the opportunity to introduce equally necessary items, such as the compulsory wearing of lifejackets, was strongly opposed by industry representatives or ignored by the DTp.
Pre-employment medical examination is compulsory for merchant seamen,37 commercial divers,38 and pilots.39 But fishermen require neither examination nor even health screening-an omission which is at variance with DTp requirements for seafarers37 and with occupational health practice elsewhere. 40 One fifth of all deaths of fishermen at sea are due to undisclosed disease.23 Gastrointestinal4l 42 and respiratory4' 43 
The number, type, and distribution of merchant shipping losses, up to 50 miles from the British coast, was investigated for the period 1970 9.46 Accident "black spots" included the Thames and Humber estuaries but, without standardisation for differential exposure to risk, these might merely reflect zones with greater density of traffic.
Commercial activity is not restricted to the sea surface: helicopter use in support of North Sea operations is likely to remain high because of helicopter versatility47 and because 75% of oil and gas personnel in the 1990s will be based more than 100 nautical miles offshore (RG Procter, Edinburgh conference, 1985). Helicopter accident experience per 100000 hours exposure is between five and 50 times greater than that of fixed wing jet aircraft.47 About 60% of helicopter accidents has been attributed to "pilot error" and, increasingly, the ergonomic aspects of North Sea flying operations arouse concern.48 49 The contention that over-water safety is further compromised by the risks of pilot ill health arising from inflight environmental hazards of noise, vibration, heat, and other factors (including seat and control layout) is under joint investigation coordinated by the Civil Aviation Authority. Helicopter ditching experience and factors influencing post-ditching survival in the North Sea (1970-83) have been discussed.47 50 51 Risks to ship and aircraft crews and to passengers travelling on and over the sea justify attention. Firstly, the inadequacies of legislation governing medical supplies aboard ships52-54 and the absence of basic equipment and drugs for life threatening emergencies on passenger ferries have been illu-'minated by recent debate.55 60 75 The contention that concern for the safety of shipping has grown in recent years but only ". . . as an aftermath of maritime disasters rather than in anticipation of them..."6 is too simplistic but there is evidence to lend partial support for this view.76 -78 The reality is more complex: the United Kingdom has taken major initiatives-notably in the search and rescue arena. Nevertheless, parts of the maritime frontier are forgotten or, at best, command less priority. Fishing industry safety, particularly the investigation and prevention of losses, clearly demands scFupulous attention: policy objectives should be formulated, published, discussed more widely and openly, and their implementation independently monitored.
A recent review of the functions and interconnections of United Kingdom organisations concerned with maritime safety concluded that responsibilities are excessively fragmented and that the boundaries of areas of jurisdiction of these organisations are irrelevant to current safety needs.6 Furthermore, the United Kingdom approach "differs radically" from that of other major maritime nations. As for a wider preventive strategy, these authors also point to the U-K Civil Aviation Authority, established partly to rationalise air safety functions, as a practical model for the government to replicate in pursuit of enhanced maritime safety. The need for a statutory marine safety authority was recommended more than 15 
